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Claudia Brunner 
Knowing Culture, Knowing Peace? 
Epistemological and/as Political Aspects of the 
'Culture of Peace'-lnitiative, Concept and Programme 
lntroduction1 
Within the 20 years from the first draft to the end of the UN-decade 
today, the concept of a 'culture of peace' has achieved widespread 
currency within the system of international and non-governmen-
tal organisations. Yet, it provoked only little resonance in the aca-
demic field. 2 This article is particularly interested in the epistemo-
1 I want to thank Werner Winterstelner for commenting on an earlier draft of 
this article, and Helmut Krieger for many houn of cliscussing my argument 
and its Umitations. 
2 A keyword research In the ISI Web of Knowledge database (accessed July 23, 
2010) provides 1.264 entries for the terms 'culture' and 'war', but only 102 
for the comblnation of 'culture' and 'peace'. Among these, only a few ar-
tlcles deal with the UNESCO concept. If they do so, they are quantitative 
empirical stuclies trylng to verify or falsify the concept (Basabe et al. 2007; 
De Rivera 2004; De Rivera et al. 2007a; De Rivera et al. 2007b) that do not 
elaborate on the concept as such. Others use the term in a different con-
text without further references to the concept (Wolfrum 2000; L6pez et al. 
2007), and some articles use the terminology without cliscussing it in more 
depth (e. g. Seifert 2007). Tue only works (written in English) uniquely fo-
cusing on the UNESCO concept were written by David Adams (e. g. 1997; 
2000), who coorclinated and led the research unit and emboclies the concept 
and program like no other scholar does. This is not to say that no scholar-
ly work on the concept and program exists. lt is obvious though, that this 
work does not exist in the normalised and intemationally acknowledged 
form of peer 1eviewed scholary articles that feed such databases and give 
way to further research. Scholarly work that has not been published 01 at 
least key-worded and abstracted for international databases is very unlikely 
to enter the academic debates on a global level and remains inside smaller 
and less accessible cliscursive communities (e. g. articles not In English [e. 
g. Drouhaud 1997) and/01 in anthologies [e. g. Giesecke 1999), articles in 
small joumals that are not indexed, conference papers, unpublished dis-
sertations, working papers etc.). Similar results can be found in the Ger-
man speaking world: Wissenschaft & Frieden, a joumal for peace research, 
does not offer 'culture' among its key categories. A keyword search offers 
logical dimensions of the concept, in its explicit terminology and 
in its implidt theoretical background. lt embeds these reflections 
into the ongoing transformation of an international (geo)political-
order which is anything but peaceful. By discussing some of the 
concept's and programme's ambivalences, 1 reflect upon links to 
the global political context of their beginnings, deployments and 
prospects. Moreover, 1 point out some of the inconsistencies and 
limits of the 'culture of peace'-initiative and show how the explic-
it and implidt definitions of 'the cultural' have changed through-
out the process of the institutionalisation and popularisation both 
of the initiative and the notion itself. Finally, the developments of 
the 'culture of peace'-initiative have tobe contextualised towards 
the massive changes and the rearrangements of international poli-
tics after 1989 and since 2001. Around these two turning points in 
international relations, 'the cultural' has experienced an ambiva-
lent renaissance. 
The argument is organised along five questions: 
• Why has 'the cultural' become so attractive within internati-
onal relations/IR3 (understood as both the field of politics and 
the field of academia)? 
• Whose culture and whose peace are we talking about? 
• What happened to the concept along the process of its institu-
tionalisation inside the UN system? 
• Who is speaking for whom in the politics of a 'culture of 
peace'? 
• Can we know 'peace' once we know 'culture'? 
two short papers on the 'culture of peace'-concept (Adams 2007; De Rivera 
2009), the latter being an answer to the former. An earlier special issue on 
the topic takes up the UNESCO-concept (Lammers et al. 1995), but is not 
followed by further discus.si.ons in the joumal. Werner Wintersteiner has 
wrltten numerous articles on the issue, but since they are publlshed in Ger-
man andin anthologies (e. g. Wintersteiner 2006), these texts do not appear 
in international databases. Tue same is true for two books titled "Kultur des 
Friederu" (Vogt et al. 1997; Bialas et al. 1999), as it certainly is for similar 
publications in languages other than E.nglish. 
3 International Relations (IR) in capitals refers to the academic discipline. 
When I speak of international relations in lower case letters, I mean the 
practice of politics in a wide definition of the notion on an international 
level, including academic knowledge production which is closely llnked to 
polltics. 
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The perspective taken to answer them can best be described as situ-
ated against the multidisdplinary background of political sdence, 
sodology of knowledge, feminist international relations and post-
colonial theory. 
2 International Relations and the Cultural Turn: 
Why has 'the Cultural'Become so Attractive? 
Even though approaches informed by Postcolonial Studies and oth-
er critical traditions have started to challenge the disdplinary fields 
across which Peace Studies are primarily situated, the epistemologi-
cal heritage of positivist and realist mainstream International Re-
lations in the second hall of the 2Qlh century still dominates the 
terrain (Richmond 2005). Nevertheless, the academic field of Inter-
national Relations discovered 'culture' and/or 'civilisation' as new 
buzzwords, while 'culture of peace' made its way to the UN gener-
al assembly. In fact, 'the cultural' unfolded enormous success. Live-
ly and controversially debating (among others) Huntington's (1993 
and 1996) theses on a presumed 'clash of civilisatlons11 mainstream 
discourse appropriated 'the cultural' as a variable and a category, but 
not in the sense of a complex theoretical debate. lt succeeded in in-
tegrating it into dominant paradigms, since it appropriated the no-
tion without doser epistemological assessment, or, tobe more pre-
dse, by integrating only what was compatible with these paradigms. 
According to Mahmood Mamdani, it was from then on that "no 
longer the market (capitalism), nor the state (democracy), but cul-
ture (modemity)'' (Mamdani 2005, p. 18) was said to be "the divid-
ing line between those in favour of a peaceful, dvic existence" (ibid.) 
and those inclined to political violence and terror. In political dis-
course and international diplomacy, this trend of a culturalisation 
of the political and of a very selective use of 'the cultural' is even 
more evident and at the same time more difficult to oppose. It is in 
this context that the ambivalences of the 'culture of peace'-initiative 
have tobe discussed at the end of the UN decade. Today, lt seems to 
be more appropriate to speak of 'culture/s' than of structure/s and 
power relations. This move is not without consequences. It flattens 
the analysis of politically made contradictions and their root causes, 
and it silences critique of dominant knowledge claims. The trend of 
culturalisation risks tuming the political into the cultural, the cul-
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tural into the natural, and the natural into what can only be over-
ruled or at best be managed, but not any more negotiated, chal-
lenged or changed. To put it differently, talking about 'the cultural' 
in the field of international relations/IR does not necessarily mean 
to integrate cultural theories in all their profound complexity, nor 
does it necessarily implicate to build upon the anti-hegemonic and 
critical traditions among them. On the contrary, the shift towards 
culturalisation can also mean appropriatlng 'culture' as an attractive 
new category and thereby tuming it into a label rather obfuscating 
than clarifying one of the central subject-matters of International 
Relations and Peace Studies: war, violence, and politlcal conflict -
and how to deal with it or to overcome it. 
Tue utopia of peace and the desire for it stands at the beginning 
not only of the specific programme discussed in this volume, but 
of the UN as a whole. This partlcular institution of international 
negotiation and cooperation was established right after World War 
II, in order to avoid or at least manage international conflicts be-
tween nations in the future, and to consolidate the emerging new 
world order coming into force at that time. Yet, we must not forget 
that the establishment of the UN system was framed in the logic of 
the inter-national, i. e., the model of the nation state along whose 
logic the internationalisation of the world order was further insti-
tutionalised and legitimised. That said the idea and reality of the 
modern liberal and capitalist nation state, on which 1 will get back 
later, lies at the very heart of the mechanisms and organisational 
structures of the UN. 'Culture' did not constitute a major frame 
of reference of academic or political debate until the late 1970s 
and 1980s. lt was only at the decline of this historically specific 
configuration that 'culture' made its way as an explanatory power 
across the field of the theories and politics of international rela-
tions. One could say that the invention and establishment of the 
'culture of peace'-programme started off as a byproduct of the re-
arrangement of the international order after 1989 (the fall of the 
'iron curtain'), for which it was certainly not prepared. Its further 
development and implementation mirrors another major caesu-
ra in the global order during the last 20 years: the era of what we 
know as a putatively 'global' 'war on terror' (which is in fact a uni-
versalised project of particular interests) after the terrorist attacks 
on US-American soil in 2001. As Gertrud Brücher states, the first 
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date (1989) stands for the enforcement of a 'Westem/Occidental' 
model of civilisation, based on the major constitutional elements 
of parliamentary democracy and the market, which appears as an 
irreversible turning point of capitalist-democratic success, whereas 
the second date (2001) stands for nothing less than the endanger-
ment of the first (Brücher 2002, p. 7). This is the spectrum in which 
1 locate the 'culture of peace'-initiative, its relative discursive suc-
cess and its relative political failure. 
3 Discou rse of Power and Practice of Govern mentality: 
Whose Culture, Whose Peace? 
The problem I want to focus on, is that even though the concept of 
the 'culture of peace' was initially not at all designed to legitimise 
preemptive wars and other military interventions in the name of 
democracy, stability and peace, it can be used in this sense today. 
This is due to a renaissance of culturalised difference in the fields 
of international relations and domestic policies. lt is against this 
background that Wendy Brown's4 work on the notion of tolerance 
comes into play. According to her, as soon as culture starts to re-
place power relations, the hegemonic is reassured as the univer-
sal and the subordinated as the minoritised (Brown 2006, p. 186). 
Along with a simplified use of 'culture' comes a discourse of pow-
er and a practice of govemmentality (ibid.) that is no more about 
rights and claims (fighting for equality), which were among the 
leading terminology in Peace Studies andin the peace movement in 
the 1960s and 1970s. From the middle of the 1990s on, a discourse 
of power and practice of govemmentality has gradually been rear-
ranged around 'cultural' difference and tolerance (conceding hier-
archically organised coexistence). According to Brown, I therefore 
argue that we can distinguish between two analytical dimensions 
of the 'culture of peace'- initiative and its outcome. First, it can be 
4 Wendy Brown is professor of Gender and Women's Studies and Political Sci-
ence at UC Berkeley. lt is her book Regulating Av~ion. Tolerance in the Age of 
Identity and Empire (2006) that inspired me to reflect on the notion of 'cul-
ture' in the context the UN-decade and develop the argument presented in 
this article. For a podcast of the book's argument on tolerance and aversion 
see Brown's interview with Philosophy Bites, URL http://www.philosophy-
bites.libsyn.com/index.php?posUd=406092 (accessedJuly 19, 2010). 
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understood as a personal and moral ethic that issues from an indi-
vidual commitment and is compatible with and transferable to the 
agendas of NGOs and/or individual agents. In this sense, a critical 
and comprehensive understanding of 'the cultural' (as outlined in 
the early UN documents) can be translated into projects of peace 
education and communicated to and embraced by those who sub-
scribe such an understanding of 'the cultural'. Even if the early 
drafts went beyond this individualised focus and spoke of a societal 
and political ethic and moral of peace, as opposed to a historically 
prevalent practice of war, 1 argue that it is the understanding out-
lined above that the international community of nation states was 
willing to agree with, since it largely delegated the responsibility of 
peace to the individual. The flipside of this understanding is a ped-
agogisation of a 'culture of peace' that can be easily separated from 
political power asymmetries on a global scale. Secondly, when sep-
arated from one's own responsibility and generously meant to be 
imposed on the other, 'culture of peace' must be read as a political 
discourse, regime, or governmentality that potentially involves the 
rtsk of producing a particular mode of reorganising global contra-
dictions and of dislocating what has successfully been culturalised 
before. Both understandings are closely interconnected with the 
political as weil as with the epistemological evolution of the 'cul-
ture of peace'-programme. One could argue that the UN initiative 
on a 'culture of peace' represents the negative to the right of resist-
ance equally laid down in official UN documents and humanitar-
ian law - and that the different notions of 'culture' constitute the 
dividing line between the hopeful accessibility of the former and 
the growing illegitimacy of the latter. As one small but remarkable 
indicator of this dynamics, I discuss how and why the major docu-
ments have changed their titles over time in the next section; what 
this shift stands for, andin what sense 1 consider it as ambivalent. 
4 From Local Pedagogics to Global Politics and Back Again: 
What was Lost Along the Way? 
lt all started at the dawn of the Cold War, as a bottom-up initia-
tive in Latin America, in the field of peace education and peda-
gogy. The experience of dictatorship and the rule of the military 
made people put their efforts in building up a civil society that 
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could resist political suppression in the future. Among these efforts 
were numerous pedagogical projects. It was activists and theorists 
who experienced and analysed the disastrous effects of military vi-
olence and the resistance against it and then made efforts to come 
up with alternatives on the micro-level of interpersonal relations 
and intrapersonal change of mentalities. Out of a concrete peace 
education programme from Peru in the 1980s grew a global po-
litical initiative inside UNESCO that finally made it to the top of 
the UN. Yet, it did not remain unchanged on its way through and 
across international politics and diplomacy. lt was at the very mo-
ment of the fall of the 'iron curtain' that the notion of 'culture of 
peace' took shape and turned into a paradigmatic slogan. The re-
sults were the UNESCO-programme "Towards a Culture of Peace", 
launched in 1994, and the proclamation of an "International Year 
for the Culture of Peace" for the year 2000. The "International Year 
2000" was explidtly named "From a Culture of War towards a CUl-
ture of Peace". A year before the attacks of '9/11' and the declara-
tion of 'international terrorism' as the world's greatest scourge, fol-
lowed by the assumedly 'global war on terror', the International 
Year (proclaimed in 1997) still bore the reasons for its existence 
in its title, namely a so-called 'culture of war'. lt was exactly this 
element, though, which gradually vanished from the documents 
and titles, from the slogans and political formulas, while anoth-
er rationale arose. A year later, in 1998, the "International Decade 
for the Promotion of a Culture of Peace and Non-Violence for the 
Children of the World 2001-2010" was declared by the UN General 
Assembly. Over the first ten years after the breakdown of the bipo-
lar Cold War order, war and violence as structural conditions of the 
lack of peace were omitted from the official discourse. What came 
in instead were the notions 'non-violence' and 'the children of the 
world'. While the 'children of the world' and 'non-violence' were 
added to the title of the declarations, it was nothing less than the 
naming and the analysis of what had been coined a 'culture of war' 
in the fust drafts submitted to the UN agencies (Adams 2000, p. 
260) that were lost along the way. Within a year of transition from 
a UNESCO programme (the organisation that is explicitly man-
dated to work in the fteld of education) to a UN decade (which is 
not), the 'culture of war' was almost gone - in the official language 
of the programme. This assumed detail merits a closer look. How 
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come that the 'culture of peace' can be officially celebrated and 
targeted at very concrete audiences (the children of the world, the 
NGOs, the teachers, the media, etc.) while the 'culture of war' has 
no more address inside the legitimated and institutionalised sys-
tem of international relations, but is delegated to non-state actors 
(as we know from the ongoing discourse on terrorism and security 
issues)? The reasons for the shift from critique to utopia, from the 
analysis of war and violence to the promises to the 'children of the 
world' must not only be searched for in the vague epistemologies 
of the laden notions of 'culture', 'war' and 'peace'. They also have 
to be located in the political system of the UN and its procedures 
in their historical and political context. Adams clearly names the 
causes for this transition that took place during almost a year of 
informal discussions at the UN level (ibid.). According to him, the 
'culture of war and violence' was literally "deleted from the final 
version" (Adams 2007). It was the European Union and other dom-
inant countries and regions who threatened to block the passage 
of the document in the UN General Assembly and finally succeed-
ed in taking out all references to what drcumscribed the dimen-
sion of a 'culture of war and violence'. They took the position that 
there was nothing as such, and obviously convinced all other part-
ners and adversaries in the discussion to concentrate on the second 
part of the concept, the 'culture of peace'. Tue latter is obviously 
more attractive and easier to promote in a time period of a general 
rise of 'the cultural', when it comes to define the Seif in power. Tue 
most evident proof of this irony is that it was possible to formulate 
the document at the very same moment as NATO's intervention 
in Kosovo (Adams 2000, p. 260) began, only to name one example 
of double moral standards when it comes to appropriating defini-
tions. According to Adams (2009), one delegate from the USA was 
very clear in articulating his opposition, saying that his country 
was against the formulation of a 'culture of war' because it would 
be more difficult to start a war, should it be kept in the text. I sug-
gest that it is this central omission, going hand in hand with the 
integration of the 'children of the world', that constitutes both the 
concept's discursive success and its factual failure. 
Tue problem 1 have with 'the children of the world' (where ex-
actly?) and 'non-violence' (of whom exactly?) might not be evi-
dent in the first place. Given the fact that the programme goes 
89 
90 Claudia Brunner 
back to peace education, it might even seem very convincing to 
open the horizon to a future generation and put those into the 
centre who might be better capable of living what past and present 
generations have failed to establish: a 'culture of peace'. What is at 
least peculiar though is the coinddence of the disappearance of the 
'culture of war' on the one hand and the appearance of the emer-
gence of the 'children of the world' on the other. This shift illus-
trates my argument on the necessity to differentiate between peace 
as a personal and moral ethic that is to be applied to any given so-
detal system, on the one hand, and as a mode of dislocating mean-
ing into another rationale, on the other. 1 assume that the explidt 
discursive focus on the 'children of the world' was able to negotiate 
upcoming differences between national representatives within the 
UN system, who did not agree with earlier documents including a 
'culture of war'. While talking of a global 'culture of war', indud-
ing nation states and their responsibility for structural and direct 
physical violence within the international system, the erasing of 
this formula and its replacement by 'non-violence' and 'the chil-
dren of the world' definitely had the power to mobilise political 
discourse while ef:fidently gilding existing oppositions. It is direct-
ed towards the future, even towards prospective political agents, 
who might not even be bom today. Such an approach of think-
ing and speaking positively while generously passing over existing 
substantial differences and conflicts may be politically successful 
in the first place. Yet, it is probably unable to hold in the long run, 
since it lacks what should come first in any successful programme 
of conflict resolution (which is hardly the case, though): an analy-
sis of what exactly had led to a conflict, how power and resources 
are distributed, and who the major agents of potential change are. 
lt is against this background that the slogan of a global 'culture of 
peace' (relieved from a 'culture of war' while decorated with 'non-
violence' and 'children') must have appeared tobe most attractive, 
since it allowed to generously go over existing contradictions on 
a global scale. lt is in this context that peace education was taking 
the risk of being both overstrained and overrated. In my opinion, 
it is problematic to shift the responsibility of global pacification -
which is not the same as peace - onto pedagogy and peace educa-
tion, while at the same time continuing the daily exerdse of power 
politics on a global scale. A blurred notion of 'culture' can indeed 
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sustain and foster this move. As it is mirrored in the change of 
wording of the ;culture of peace1-documents, much of what power 
politics are unable and especially unwilling to approach was rolled 
off to peace education and its imagined target group1 the ;children 
of the world'. Differently spoken; what nation states - who finally 
are still the main addressees of UN politics - keep on failing to tack-
le is delegated to the so-called global civil society; to all the NGOs 
and individuals who will put all their efforts and energies to a most 
legitimate goal that necessarily remains out of reach under the ex-
isting circumstances. 
The approach has indeed motivated many people to join the 
initiative on a grass-root level; as we know from the 75 million 
signatures of the ;culture of peace'-manifesto and the innumerous 
initiatives on all continents. Yet, it also kindled hope beyond ac-
tuality with respect to the potential effects of the honourable ef-
forts among those who were and still are deeply committed to their 
;mission; of bringing peace to the world. According to Hartmut 
von Hentig, the political programme of ~ilding peace' (which 1 
consider as a problematic term in its own rtght) constitutes an ex-
cessive demand, something that people are unlikely and probably 
even unwilling to accomplish (von Hentig 1987; pp. 62-64). In 
this setting, pedagogy and peace education are ascribed to be able 
(and often tend to believe they could indeed achieve this goal) to 
re-invent humanity from scratch. They are expected to invent a 
new human being who is naturally peaceful, while the structures 
within this reinvention should happen continue to be most asym-
metric and suppressive. They should; von Hentig goes on with his 
argument, "produce human beings who do not even want to lead 
war; peaceful and reasonable characters who come to terms with 
existing circumstances; and who are settle for sublimation, circus-
es or God;s reward" (ibid.).5 1 argue that this underlying idea about 
the potential and the tasks of peace education is part of the illusion 
and limits of a too consensual concept of a 'culture of peace' that 
has substituted the former key terms of equality and justice with 
more consensual terms like participation and education, the right 
to fight for one's rights from a position of suppression with the ob-
ligation to negotiate them without the proper resources to do so. 
5 All translations from German to English were done by the author. 
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Instead of understanding the world as a complex web of asym-
metrically "entangled histories" (Randeria 2002), a view that would 
clearly point to the dominant nations' responsibilities for violence 
and interests in keeping up violent power relations, a well known 
and established logic is still at work. As the former director of the 
unit for the international year for the culture of peace at the UN 
headquarter in New York himself puts it at the dusk of the UN-
decade in a very critical tone, "the opposition to the concept of 
a culture of war reflects a refusal to admit that powerful states to-
day - just as they have been from the beginning of recorded his-
tory - depend on the culture of war to retain their power" (Adams 
2000, p. 260). It seems to me that this problematic is the key to an 
understanding of why the initiative and all its declarations and 
documents seem to represent a parallel cosmos in their own right, 
existing along all the legitimised wars and conflicts the world has 
experienced since the decade has been taking shape some twenty 
years ago. Tue promoters of the programme certainly cannot and 
must not be held responsible for each and every evil in the world. 
But the fact that some of the most powerful nations of the UN sys-
tem, those who tend to loudly and proudly praise the white pi-
geon's flight when it comes to legitimating military Intervention 
in quasi-naturally 'unpeaceful' areas of the world, deny war and 
violence on their own sides while confidently continuing to apply 
violence both, in domestic and in international politics, is more 
than just a detail. lt is a constitutive element of the epistemologies 
of politics and of the politics of epistemology, and it has been so 
for the last 500 years, since the beginnings of the expansion of Eu-
ropean colonial and imperial power across the globe. 
5 Political and Epistemological Eurocentrism: Who is Speaking for Whom? 
What Mahmood Mamdani critically terms "culture talk" (2004, p. 
17) is nothing less than an explanatory framework that allows to 
think of modemity and political violence in a specifically eurocen-
tric relation to each other. 1 t says that we have to remember that 
the pioneer 'culture of peace'-programmes on anational level took 
place in countries not located in EuroAmerica, but where conflict 
and strife are 'normally' located or even expected from a eurocen-
tric perspective. fil Salvador, Mozambique, Burundi, Nicaragua and 
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Somalia were the first countries that engaged in concretely imple-
menting the programme. lt is certainly comprehensible, legitimate 
and necessary to start intensive and comprehensive programmes 
where armed conflict and/or postwar instability are acute and af-
fect people's lives in most immediate ways. Still, such an approach 
underlines the fact that zones like Europe, Northem America or 
other members or the 'global West/North' hardly ever are thought 
of when it comes to defining where peace is not and where it has 
tobe brought to. While it is imagined that "the core increasing-
ly organized itself as a transnational open access order ('the zone 
of peace')11 (Buzan 2010, p. 17), the 'peripheries' are thought of 
as having "remained in natural state form, unable to avoid deep 
structural tensions with the open access order" (ibid). lt is actually 
rarely named in which ways the former is accountable for the lat-
ter. In such an approach, EuroAmerica still holds the position of 
the entity being capable, willing and even obliged to 'bring peace', 
while the politically and epistemologically framed zones of insta-
bility, failed or rogue states, etc. are thought of as remaining in 
what is still understood as some sort of 'natural state' of an 'under-
developed' society and (non-)order. To illustrate this argument, let 
me invite you to take a look at the map of the world as it is colour-
fully presented in the Global Peace Index (2010) by the Institute of 
Economics and Peace. According to specific indicators that can be 
traced in the detailed reports on its website, the Australian think 
tank shows the most 'peaceable' nations of the world in green, the 
less peaceable ones in red, and others in shades of yellow and or-
ange. At first sight, the map is convincing and most of all reassur-
ing for Europeans. But as with the example of the .first nations to 
implement programmes within the 'culture of peace'-initiative, it 
is striking that regions like Northem America and Europe are again 
presented explicitly as those where the privilege of peace is not on-
ly 'naturally' located, but implicitly where it is supposed to come 
from both historically and in the future, as the institute's explicit 
intention is to provide information on the factors for successful 
business making around the globe. Yet, the map would look fairly 
different if the variables for empirical research were different ones. 
If they were elaborated on the basis of a 'positive' peace (includ-
ing the elimination of structural violence etc.) and not a 'negative' 
one (based exclusively on the absence of what is defined as war 
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etc.), other factors would have come to the forefront and change 
the self-assuring image of where peace is located. If the produc-
tion and sale of military weapons, the consumption of energy and 
the ecological footprint, or the economic profit of crude exploita-
tion of natural and human resources would figure as indicators for 
(non-)peacefulness, the reds and greens on the map would indeed 
be organized differently- and the colourful picture would be much 
more inconvenient for those in charge of global political and epis-
temological power. Tue existing map however shows that like tol-
erance, peace is "generally conferred by those who do not require 
it on those who do" (Brown 2006, p. 13). 
This attitude of how and where to locate peacefulness is deep-
ly rooted in examples of eurocentric and universalist morality and 
polity claims that have a long tradition of legitimising exploitation 
on a global scale. These also translate into parts of the 'culture of 
peace'-initiative, as is illustrated by the conclusion of the final re-
port to the first international forum on the 'culture of peace'. In this 
document, it is said that "[w]inning peace means a successful com-
mitment to build, on the foundations of democracy, a new culture 
of tolerance and generosity which is, in a word, a task of love" (Final 
Report 1994, p. 19). What could be more illustrative of Brown's cri-
tique than such a statement, issued by a high-ranking UN official? 
Who is it on whose shoulders not only the blessings, but also the 
burdens of such a tolerance, a generosity, and finally, still reverberat-
ing the sound of Christian colonialism, of such a love are being put? 
Do those who suffer from violence and war want tobe tolerated, 
loved and treated with generosity in the first place? ls it not intelligi-
ble anymore to speak of recognition, justice and equality after 1989? 
Or even worse, are generosity, tolerance and love primarily directed 
to the perpetrators, since they have to be included in such an ap-
peal? And isn't it cynical to state in the same breath that "no human 
group has ever won a war" (ibid.), knowing quite well which groups 
of which societies gain enormous material and immaterial profits 
from warfare and structural violence and all other forms of "organ-
ized peacelessness" (Bialas 1999, p. 239)? 
During my research, I came across another peculiarity feminist 
and/or postcolonial perspectives are familiar with. Why are most 
of the routes of research leading back to only a few authors who 
seem to embody and personify the entire project? Even though 
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the most profound critiques and complex ideas can be attributed 
to the name of David Adams, and even though he has indeed to 
be both admired and thanked for having put years of his life into 
this project, one has to be clear in naming the position from where 
the 'culture of peace' has been spread into global politics. Posi-
tions like his are certainly positions of critique and intervention, 
but they still are positions of privilege, located within the political, 
economic, and epistemological centres of the world. The concept 
was in all probability developed by many people who contributed 
in manifold ways to all the drafts, documents, manifestos, reports, 
etc. In the end though, for the interested researcher looking for 
material on the subject, only very few names appear on publica-
tions on the matter. We must understand these dynamics not on 
the level of the personal, the individual, but as the manifestation 
of a hegemonic organisation of knowledge and power as an indica-
tor of eurocentric epistemologies and politics that have managed 
to universalise their particularities (Said 1994). Meanwhile, innu-
merable calls for a culture of peace in various contexts, albeit not 
necessarily under this label and, more importantly, not articulated 
from positions of epistemological power, have remained unheard 
or forgotten throughout history (Boulding 2000). 
6 Discipline, Power and the Nation State: 
Can we Know 'Peace' once we Know 'Culture'? 
As Werner Wintersteiner puts it, 'culture' and 'peace' are moral-
ly supercharged and supposedly self-explanatory terms. Their very 
combination is not only fascinating, but also intimidating (2001, 
p. 15). Moreover, it is often the most simple terms that turn out to 
be the most dif:ficult to define. Definition, though, constitutes the 
basis for what can (and what can't) be achieved with a given con-
cept. While the slogan has made its way across and through insti-
tutionalised international politics, a substantial academic assess-
ment of the concept remains a desideratum. Why is this the case? 
What is wrong with an idea that can be appropriated and used 
by very different political agents in the international community 
without major obstacles, and at the same time remain so poorly 
theorised (ibid., p. 13)? And would it finally make a difference if 
academics spent more time doing so? 
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As Johan Galtung has shown in his own efforts of tuming 'the 
cultural' into a relevant paradigm for peace studies, it is often ap-
plied in a dichotomous way inside the academic field itself. Corre-
sponding with the disciplinary structures of bodies of knowledge, 
a powerful dichotomy is arranged around the alterity issue on a 
global epistemological scale that translates into political practic-
es. Tue result is a binary understanding of 'the cultural' in differ-
ent contexts. 'Culture' inside the field of the humanities (dealing 
with fine arts and cultural production) bears a thoroughly distinct 
notion than 'culture' does in the field of cultural anthropology, 
where it is coined to describe the distant Other (see Galtung 1996, 
p. 208). According to Wendy Brown, this comprises two particular 
purports: first, "the autonomy of the subject from culture - the idea 
that the subject is prior to culture and free to choose culture" and 
second, "the idea that politics is above culture and free of culture" 
(Brown 2006, p. 167). In this understanding, which is only appli-
cable to certain subjects and not at all thought as universal, cul-
ture is thought of as something extrinsic, individually achievable 
for the superior (the enlightened autonomous subject of the mod-
ern nation state, claiming deliberative Kantian rationality as a basis 
for 'etemal peace'). At the same time, a second notion of culture is 
retained as something intrinsic, collectively natural (ascribing es-
sentialist features to those who are said to be incapable of escaping 
their violent character/nature). One has to keep in mind that the 
very term 'culture' only emerged in the 18th century, not coming 
into use until the middle of the 19th century (Williams 1983, pp. 
87, 88). As today, it has been used synonymously with 'dvilisation' 
(ibid.) in the 18th century, and it was conceived in order to make 
a distinction from a theocentrist world view, promoting the shift 
from feudal collectivism to liberal autonomy of the individual. 
From today's perspective, this is particularly interesting, since to-
day the term is often equated with or substituted for religion - ex-
plidtly so when it comes to defining the Other, implidtly when lt 
is about ascertaining the Seif in power (Brunner 2010, pp. 326 ff.). 
Moreover, 'culture' has never been thought of as equally accessible 
for or attributable to everybody. "Rather, 'we' have culture while 
culture has 'them', or we have culture while they are a culture. Or, 
we are a democracy, while they are a culture. This asymmetry tums 
on an imagined opposition between culture and individual moral 
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autonomy, in which the former vanquishes the latter unless cul-
ture is itself subordinated by liberalism" (Brown 2006, p. 151). 
Finally, it has tobe kept in mind that the rise of the notion of cul-
ture took place when the modern nation state assumed shape, dur-
ing the 1st11 and 19t11 centuries, along with the further speciftcation 
of academic disciplines. lt was in this period of ongoing colonial ex-
pansion and competition between the rising European powers that 
both the humanities (to establish bodies of knowledge about the me-
tropolises of the world market) and anthropology (to define bodies 
of knowledge about the peripheries that were to serve the centres 
in manifold ways) came into existence. These are the disciplinary 
fields where 'the cultural' has been located academically for about 
ZOO years, and this is where culture and imperialism have been going 
hand in hand ever since (Said 1994). As we can see in Galtung's writ-
ings mentioned above, this early split of academic disdplines and 
their relatedness to domestic and international politics is co-consti-
tutive of the different notions of 'culture' that we still have to cope 
with today. And, to be dear, it is the modern liberal capitalist nation 
state following the eurocentric model of enlightenment, democracy 
and progress, at whose service both political and epistemological ef-
forts have been efficiently directed ever since. This nation state is a 
very spedftc construction and arrangement of violence and power 
(Albrecht-Heide 2000). As the basis of international relations and its 
institutions (among which we also have to count the UN system), 
this nation state is not only grounded in violence and war, but has 
also come to hold the ultimate monopoly of the latter. lt is the ba-
sis of legitimating all the bloody confrontations inside a given terri-
tory as well as between nationally defined entities, and in that sense 
it is a major obstade for peace, too. The historical entanglements of 
knowledge and power along the establishment of the nation state 
and democracy give way to take a doser look on how violence is em-
bedded in the first (nation state), while being camouflaged by the 
second (democracy). Even though 1 can't discuss the differences be-
tween 'nation' and 'state' here, it is still true and applicable to my ar-
gument what Charles Tilly articulated in the 1970s: "War made the 
state, and the state made war'' (1975, p. 42). This is even more ap-
propriate when we translate it onto a contemporary global scale: Le-
gitimised war led by nation states or by international alliances and 
supranational bodies does make and remake the international or-
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der, and the international order makes and remakes the legitimacy 
of certain forms of war and violence. Those forms which are legiti-
mised by the nation state or its extension into the international are 
then attributed the potential or even the obligation of ex:porting 'cul-
tural' achievements and 'dviliz.atory' achievements like democracy, 
freedom, etc., whereas other forms (illegitimised, because emanat-
ing from a substate level) increasingly tend to be defined as bound 
to 'cultural' habits and 'dvilisational' backwardness. What therefore 
disappears from view is how the former and the latter are historically, 
politically, and economically linked to each other, and how deeply 
asymmetric these links are organised on a global scale. 
7 Conclusion 
Ever since the 'culture of peace'-initiative has come into being and 
has changed into a UN programme two major tuming points have 
reshaped the world order. As I argue, the politics and epistemolo-
gies of the concept are not untouched by the events of 1989 and 
2001, between and around which the 'cultural turn' in interna-
tional relations/IR has tobe situated. lt is against this background 
that the potential vigour and the actual ambivalences of the con-
cept and its institutionalisation have to be assessed at the end of 
the UN decade. Among these ambivalences 1 pointed at the cultur-
alisation of the political, the pedagogisation of peace-building, the 
fading of what was initially named the 'culture of war', and a euro-
centrism which is embedded into the epistemologies as weil as into 
the politics of the 'culture of peace'-initiative. This has to do with 
the selective way 'the cultural' is negotiated in different contexts in 
international relations. These practices of knowledge formation are 
deeply enmeshed in global politics and its transformations within 
a still imperial and capitalist frame. This frame systemically neces-
sitates violence and war to sustain itself, and at the same time it 
claims to provide the only guarantee for democracy, freedom, and 
peace. This is what we have to remember when speaking of a 'cul-
ture of peace' and/or a 'culture of war' on a global scale. 
I want to conclude my considerations by mentioning the no-
tion of "epistemic violence" as understood by Gayatri Chakravorty 
Spivak (1994). Following scholars of Postcolonial and/or Feminist 
Studies, she locates the power of academic knowledge production 
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in the heart of asymmetric global power relations and vice versa. 
That said, reflection on the epistemologies and/as the politics of 
Peace Studies and on its translations into the political system of in-
ternational relations is at the same time reflection about the histori-
cal and political context of both. In that sense, a critical assessment 
of the 'culture of peace'-initiative, document:s and programmes can 
provide us with insights about the cultural turn arriving in inter-
national politics, its potentials and limitations. In addition to that, 
we will be able to name the specific historical and political cir-
cumstances under which certain paradigms achieve prominence 
while others are on decline. Finally, we will have to critically as-
sess whether the official 'culture of peace' in its existing form is 
still what it was meant tobe at the out:set. If this is not the case, we 
have to be clear in naming reasons for that change on the politlcal 
as well as on the epistemological level. Additionally, we should al-
so ask ourselves whether the 11culture talk11 (Mamdani 2004, p. 17) 
on war and peace not only fails to fully analyse and overcome ex-
isting traditions of inter- and intrastate violence, but if it even has 
its potential share in the epistemic violence rooted in eurocentric 
and universalist traditions of domination that contribute to other 
forms of violence - politically and epistemologically. 
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